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ABSTRACT
Proof-of-Stake systems randomly choose, on each round, one of the
participants as a consensus leader that extends the chain with the
next block such that the selection probability is proportional to the
owned stake. However, distributed random number generation is
notoriously difficult. Systems that derive randomness from the pre-
vious blocks are completely insecure; solutions that provide secure
random selection are inefficient due to their high communication
complexity; and approaches that balance security and performance
exhibit selection bias. When block creation is rewarded with new
stake, even a minor bias can have a severe cumulative effect.
In this paper, we propose Robust Round Robin, a new consensus
scheme that addresses this selection problem. We create reliable
long-term identities by bootstrapping from an existing infrastruc-
ture, such as Intel’s SGX processors, or by mining them starting
from an initial fair distribution. For leader selection we use a deter-
ministic approach. On each round, we select a set of the previously
created identities as consensus leader candidates in round robin
manner. Because simple round-robin alone is vulnerable to attacks
and offers poor liveness, we complement such deterministic se-
lection policy with a lightweight endorsement mechanism that is
an interactive protocol between the leader candidates and a small
subset of other system participants. Our solution has low good
efficiency as it requires no expensive distributed randomness gen-
eration and it provides block creation fairness which is crucial in
deployments that reward it with new stake.
1 INTRODUCTION
Any decentralized digital currency requires a consensus mechanism
to prevent double spending. Bitcoin [33] leverages Proof of Work
(PoW) [17] and economic incentives to achieve consensus in a per-
missionless setting, assuming that the adversary does not control
majority of the computing power and messages are delivered suffi-
ciently reliably [18]. Experience from the last ten years has shown
that it is indeed possible to realize a digital currency without a
trusted authority. However, Bitcoin also has serious limitations: its
throughput is low (7 tps), its latency is high (60 minutes) and most
importantly it wastes huge amounts of energy. The estimated en-
ergy consumption of all Bitcoin miners is comparable to a medium
size country [16].
Recently, several alternative permissionless blockchain consen-
sus schemes have been proposed. Proof of Stake (PoS) is arguably
the most prominent approach that avoids the above energy waste.
The basic idea in most PoS systems is to randomly choose, on each
round, one of the system participants as a consensus leader that
extends the chain with a new block. Selection is performed such
Figure 1: The state-of-the-art PoS systems choose consensus
leaders randomlywhich enables good liveness andDoS resis-
tance. Some such schemes use distributed randomness gen-
eration that is efficient but can be biased and therefore such
solutions do not provide fairness. Other schemes use unbi-
ased distributed randomness generation with high commu-
nication cost. Our solution, Robust Round Robin, is fair and
efficient, but provides weaker DoS resistance.
that the probability of being chosen as the leader is proportional to
the owned stake like coins.
However, secure random selection in a distributed setting is dif-
ficult. The initial PoS schemes that derive randomness from the
previous blocks are susceptible to grinding attacks and completely
insecure. Recent PoS schemes like Ouroboros [25] or DFINITY [20]
that use secure random beacon protocols have high communica-
tion and computation complexity and are therefore inefficient. PoS
systems like Algorand [30] and Ouroboros Praos [14] enable more
efficient random selection, but such schemes are susceptible to se-
lection bias. When block creation is rewarded with new stake, as is
a common practice, even a small bias can have a large cumulative
effect. For example, in Algorand-style leader selection an adversary
that controls α = 0.33 of stake when the system has 1,000 units
of stake, collects 36% of block rewards and new stake. Once the
system has 10,000 units of stake, the adversary controls majority of
the stake and collects more than 70% of the rewards.
Usage of trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel’s
SGX, have also been proposed as a solution to the leader selection
problem. Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) [1] is an example system
where attested enclaves wait a random time and the enclave that
finishes first becomes the leader. The drawback is that a compro-
mised SGX processor wins the leader selection arbitrarily often,
and thus participants have an incentive to attack their own plat-
forms. Several successful attacks against SGX have been recently
demonstrated [11, 23, 34, 36].
Our solution. In this paper, to addresses the leader selection
problem, we propose a new permissionless blockchain consensus
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scheme called Robust Round Robin. We establish reliable and long-
term identities and record the enrollment of each identity to the
ledger. The number of identities controlled by each participant in
the system is limited to their stake and we propose two concrete
ways to establish identities, and thus two notions of stake.
Our first identity creation mechanism is bootstrapping from ex-
isting infrastructures. As an example infrastructure, we use Intel’s
SGX processors and attestation service (IAS) such that the stake
of each participant is the number of SGX processors he controls.
Although we instantiate our solution using SGX, we emphasize
that our approach is not limited to SGX, but similar identities could
be bootstrapped also from other infrastructures such as mobile sub-
scriptions or credit cards. Our second identity creation mechanism
is “mining” the identities starting from an initial fair distribution.
In this approach, the identities themselves function as stake. The
first approach applies to partially-decentralized setting where the
consensus is permissionless but the infrastructure providers, like
Intel, needs to be trusted (for attestation). The second approach
applies to fully-decentralized setting similar to Bitcoin.
Our solution performs deterministic leader candidate selection.
We assign an age to each identity and place them into a queue in
the order of decreasing age. Our notion of age is the number of
rounds since the enrollment of the identity or its previous successful
block creation. Once a chosen leader candidate creates a block
successfully, its age becomes zero and it moves to the end of the
queue again, essentially achieving round-robin candidate selection.
Because such simple round-robin selection is vulnerable to at-
tacks and provides poor liveness, we complement it with a light-
weight endorsement mechanism. On each round, we sample a
small subset of other identities as endorsers. Each deterministically-
chosen leader candidate runs a simple protocol with the endorsers
and the candidate that receives the required quorum of confirma-
tions becomes the leader to create a new block. In rare cases, more
than one candidate may be chosen, or more than one block created
by the same leader, but the probability of such events on multiple
successive rounds reduces exponentially and therefore forks remain
shallow. The adversary may bias endorser selection, but that does
not enable attacks like double spending or increase his rewards.
We call our solution Robust Round Robin, in contrast to simple and
insecure standard round robin.
The main benefits of our solution compared to other PoS systems
are fairness and efficiency. As highlighted in Figure 1, solutions
like Algorand [30] and Ouroboros Praos [14] suffer from selection
bias which can have large cumulative effect. In our solution leader
selection is based on deterministic schedule and thus fair. Solutions
like Ouroborous [25] and DFINITY [20] require expensive protocols
to establish unbiased randomness periodically. Our lightweight
endorsement protocol is simple and efficient. In contrast to previous
TEE solutions like PoET [1], participants gain no advantage by
compromising their own platforms and in this regard our solution
is resilient to TEE compromise.
Deterministic leader selection has also drawbacks in contrast to
randomized selection, as shown in Figure 1. Because the selection
schedule is predictable, our solution can be more susceptible to
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that target the next leader. Another
concern is an adversary that owns several oldest identities and
therefore controls block creation on several successive rounds. Such
adversary could prevent transaction processing from targeted users
temporarily. Although such DoS attacks cannot be prevented fully,
we outline ways to make them difficult to deploy in practice.
The performance and scalability of our solution is comparable
to recent PoS schemes. Users can consider transactions safely con-
firmed once they are extended by a small number of blocks (e.g.,
d = 6 or 12). Since our endorsement protocol is simple, rounds can
be set short (e.g., 5 seconds in our experiments) which gives one or
half a minute transaction latency and throughput of 1500 tps. The
per-round communication and computation complexity is constant
and small (e.g., approximately 100 messages per round).
Contributions. To summarize, our paper makes the following
contributions:
• Selection bias analysis. Our analysis identifies that even a small
bias in leader selection can have drastic consequences in sys-
tems where block creation is rewarded with new stake. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to explain this
problem in detail.
• New consensus scheme. We propose Robust Round Robin, a
novel consensus scheme, where deterministic leader candidate
selection is complemented with a lightweight interactive en-
dorsement protocol. The main benefits of our approach are
efficiency and fairness.
• Analysis and experiments.We analyze the security of our so-
lution and estimate its performance using experiments in a
custom-built peer-to-peer network.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background on blockchain consensus and motivates our
work. Section 3 presents an overview of our solution. Section 4
details identity creation and Section 5 system operation. Section 6
provides security analysis and Section 7 performance evaluation.
Section 8 presents a discussion, Section 9 reviews related work and
Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The collective puzzle solving in PoW provides randomized leader
selection, where the selection probability is proportional to the
amount of performed work. Most PoS systems mimic such random
selection and choose a leader with a probability that is proportional
to the owned stake. In this section we review previous schemes and
their limitations.
Naive random selection. The first PoS proposals [13, 26] sug-
gested a simple technique where the hash of the previous block
functions as a “random” seed for leader selection on the next round.
However, this approach is vulnerable to grinding attacks, where the
leader of the previous rounds tries different block candidates (e.g.,
by sampling from the pool of pending transactions) and picks the
block that gives him an advantage in leader selection on the next
round. By iterating through many candidate blocks he can pick one
that makes him the leader on the next round as well.
Another simple approach is to run a bias-resistant random bea-
con protocol among all participants with stake. Random beacon is
a distributed protocol that generates a new random value periodi-
cally. The main drawback of this approach is that such protocols
2
Figure 2: Example of the cumulative effect of minor se-
lection bias in a system where block creation is rewarded
with new stake. Triangles show the adversary’s block cre-
ation rate and rewards increase. Circles show the adver-
sary’s stake increase. Squares represent the baseline (α =
0.33) of fair rewards and stake without bias.
traditionally have high communication and computation cost. For
example, the complexity of Cachin’s random beacon [12] is O(n3)
which means that performing repeated random selection among
all participants is either very expensive or completely infeasible.
Sophisticated random selection. Recent research has suggested
more efficient random beacons, both as standalone protocols and
as part of PoS blockchain systems.
RandHerd [35] is a standalone random beacon that leverages pub-
licly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) and collective signing (CoSi)
to produce unbiased and unpredictable random values among large
set of participants. RandHerd divides all participants into smaller
committees of size c . A required threshold of participants from each
committee contributes to the output random value. The per round
complexity of RandHerd is reduced to O(c2loд(n)). The main prob-
lem for permissionless blockchains is an expensive initialization
routine where participants are divided into groups which takes sev-
eral minutes. Such slow reconfiguration should be repeated when
new participants join or leave the system.
Ouroboros [25] is a PoS system with a built-in random beacon.
Ouroboros randomly samples a committee that runs PVSS-based
protocol with complexity of O(n3). Since such protocol is executed
only once per epoch, the high cost is amortized over several rounds.
However, the main drawback of this solution is that it requires
committees with honest majority which means that committees
of thousands of participants must be used to ensure their honest
majority across the entire system lifetime which makes the pro-
tocol very expensive. Moreover, Ouroboros requires synchronous
communication which is difficult to achieve in large peer-to-peer
networks.
In Algorand [30], random values are derived using verifiable
random functions (VRFs) [31]. On each round, the chosen leader
computes the next random value using a VRF and the previous
random value. A publicly verifiable proof π of this computation is
added to the block. VRF-based selection is efficient, but the main
problem is that such approach is not bias-resistant. The chosen
leader may bias the protocol output, e.g., by skipping his turn.
To illustrate the effect of such selection bias, consider an example
system where multiple leader candidates with priorities are chosen.
This approach is used in most PoS systems, because choosing only
one leader prevents the system from proceeding in case it is offline
or otherwise unable to communicate. Assume an adversary that
controls a fraction α = 0.33 of stake. On the average, every 9th
round the leader candidate with the first and second priority both
belong to the adversary, every 27th rounds this is the case for the
top three priority candidates, and so on. The adversary can now
choose which one of these leader candidates to use and pick the one
that gives the most advantageous value for next selection. While
such bias can be relatively small, its effect will cumulate when
system participation is incentivized by providing rewards like new
stake to the chosen leader (block creator), as is a common practice
in blockchain systems. Figure 2 shows an example starting from
1,000 units of stake. Due to the above bias, the adversary creates
blocks at slightly higher rate (≈ 0.36) and thus his share of stake
increases. By the time the system has 10,000 units of stake, the
adversary controls majority of the stake and creates over 70% of
the blocks, at which point the system can no longer be secure.
Ouroboros Praos [14] is another PoS scheme that also leverages
VRFs for leader selection. Similar to Algorand, selection can be
biased by the adversary. DFINITY [20] and RapidChain [37] are
further examples of recent PoS schemes that performs unbiased
leader selection with significant communication cost. We review
such solutions, and their limitations, in Section 9.
Selection using TEEs. In PoET [1], the consensus participants are
attested SGX enclaves and the enclave that finishes randomized
waiting first is chosen as the leader. Assuming that SGX ensures
code integrity, this approach enables secure leader selection. The
main drawback is that participants have an incentive to break one
of their own SGX processors which allows the participant to win
the leader selection arbitrary often. SGX was designed to protect
enclaves against malicious software and but not against physi-
cal attacks. Additionally, recent research has demonstrated that
software-only attacks like Foreshadow [23, 36] that leverage the
Meltdown vulnerability [28] can extract attestation keys from SGX
processors, essentially enabling a full break of SGX. Developing
schemes that detect processors that win statistically “too often”
may be possible, but eliminating all bias is difficult.
Requirements. Given these limitations of previous solutions, our
goal is to design a permissionless blockchain consensus scheme
that meets the following requirements.
• Fairness. Our solution should ensure leader selection fairness.
As explained above, even a relatively small bias in leader selec-
tion can have severe cumulative effects when combined with
block creation rewards.
• Efficiency. Our solution should be efficient. In particular, we
want to avoid complicated leader selection protocols that have
high communication cost.
• Tolerance to TEE compromise. If TEEs are used, the adversary
should not gain advantage by compromising protections on
his own processors. Such property enables robust deployments
in practice.
3
3 ROBUST ROUND ROBIN OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide an overview of our solution that we call
Robust Round Robin. We start by listing our assumptions. After that
we explain our main ideas, discuss challenges, and finally provide
an overview of the solution.
3.1 Assumptions
We assume that the blockchain is used for a digital currency or
another application that enables rewards that incentivize behavior
similar to monetary rewards. The blockchain is used to record and
order transactions, but our solution is agnostic to their type.
We consider two trust models. The first is a partially-decentralized
setting, where the blockchain consensus is maintained by a per-
missionless set of participants, but we rely on the integrity of an
existing infrastructure (e.g., that Intel manufactures processors and
runs the SGX attestation service correctly). Our second trust model
is a fully-decentralized setting with no trusted entities similar to
Bitcoin and most other permissionless blockchains.
We consider an adversary that controls a significant fraction α
of stake (e.g., α = 0.33). Our adversary model is non-adaptive in
the sense that the adversary cannot arbitrarily choose for every
time window which computing platforms or users’ key pairs he
controls.1 If TEEs are used, we assume that the adversary can extract
secret keys, such as attestation keys, and modify attested enclave
code on all of his own processors.
We assume that the participants communicate over a peer-to-
peer network. Within each time window t , each participants is able
to communication with all other participants except a small fraction
β (e.g., β = 0.05). This model is motivated by previous studies on the
Bitcoin network where most, but not all, nodes receive broadcasted
messages within a delay that can be easily estimated [9, 15]. Finally,
we assume that participants have loosely synchronized clocks.
3.2 Identity Creation
We create of long-term and reliable identities and record the enroll-
ment of each identity into the blockchain. This approach can be
used with different types of stake and we describe two concrete
ways to establish identities, and thus two notions of stake.
The first is bootstrapping identities from an existing infrastruc-
ture. We use Intel SGX processors as an example infrastructure to
instantiate our solution because its attestation service provides the
needed interface to implement our solution. However, we empha-
size that our solution is not limited to SGX and similarly identities
could be bootstrapped from other infrastructures like mobile sub-
scriptions, credit cards, passports or other TEEs [4]. We discuss this
further in Section 8. When SGX is used, the stake of each partic-
ipant is the number of enrolled SGX processors he controls. This
approach works in the partially-decentralized setting where trust
on Intel, or similar infrastructure provider, is required.
1We note that some previous works like Algorand and Ouroboros consider a stronger
fully-adaptive adversary [25, 30] that can freely choose controlled participants for
each time window. Our take is that such a fully-adaptive adversary is interesting, and
worth studying, but often not realistic. In practice, platform compromise is hard to
detect and repair. Furthermore, a compromise of one computing platform does not
mean that another is no longer in control of the adversary. For these reasons, we focus
on non-adaptive adversaries in this work.
Our second way to create identities is to “mine” them starting
from an initial fair distribution. That is, successful block creation
is rewarded with new identities. In this approach, the controlled
identities themselves function as the stake. This approach works
in the fully-decentralized setting. The initial fair distribution of
identities can be created using PoW.
3.3 Starting Point: Deterministic Selection
The starting point of our solution is deterministic selection. We
assign an age to each identity such that the age refers to the number
of rounds since its recorded enrollment or previous block creation
event, and we place all enrolled identities to a virtual queue that is
sorted in the decreasing order of age.2 Once an identity creates a
block successfully, its age becomes zero again and it moves back
to the end of the queue (i.e., round-robin selection). Because such
selection schedule is deterministic, the adversary cannot bias it.
Security and liveness challenges. Given such identities and deter-
ministic selection approach, perhaps the simplest solution would
be to select only the single oldest identity as the eligible leader on
each round and define that a valid chain cannot skip rounds. While
such solution would have little ambiguity about the correct leader
on each round, the solution would be completely impractical, since
the entire system would stop proceeding when the single selected
leader is offline or otherwise unable to communicate sufficiently
fast (i.e., poor liveness). Thus, we focus on solutions where multiple
oldest leader candidates, with priorities in the order of their age, are
selected and a valid chain is allowed to skip rounds. Such a system
is able to produce a new block on each round with high probability
and proceed even from the rare scenarios where all selected candi-
dates are unavailable to communicate, like a temporary large-scale
network outage.
Since we allow multiple leader candidates for each round, we
must define which chain branch is considered valid in case more
than one eligible leader candidate creates a block (i.e., the chain
forks). Another simple solution would be to parse the chain start-
ing from the beginning and on each fork favor the oldest leader
candidate. However, this approach would allow so called re-writing
the history attacks where the adversary intentionally skips block
creation on the round where he is the oldest leader candidate, but
after a long time publishes a blocks that creates a fork deep in the
chain.
To avoid such attacks, we adopt the common “longest chain”
policy where the branch with the most valid blocks is valid. Given
this definition, we have two remaining design challenges to consider.
The first challenge, deep forks, is about security. Since enrollment of
new identities is open (permissionless), the adversary could enroll,
say, 50 identities successively. Once these identities become the
oldest, they would be chosen as the leader on 50 successive rounds.
On each round, the adversary could extend one chain branch with
a new block that he broadcasts to the network immediately and
another block on a separate branch which will be published later
causing a fork that is 50 blocks deep. Both brancheswould be equally
2Although in this paper we use the age of each identity, we note similar round-robin
selection could be realized also through other means such as selecting identities in
alphabetical order.
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long and thus valid. This attack is an instance of the nothing-at-stake
problem that is a common challenge in PoS systems.
The second challenge, inactive identities, is about liveness. We
propose a scheme where participants establish long-lived identities,
but it would be unrealistic to assume that all participants stay
active in the system forever. Old and inactive identities could cause
extended periods where the system is unable to produce blocks.
3.4 Final Solution: Robust Round Robin
To address the above two challenges (i.e., deep forks and inactive
identities), we complement the simple and deterministic round-
robin selection with a lightweight leader endorsement mechanism.
On each round, a small set of oldest identities are chosen as leader
candidates. Additionally, we randomly sample a subset of recently
active identities to serve as endorsers. The sampling is based on a
random seed that is updated for each new block using verifiable
random functions (VRFs) similar to [14, 30]. Each leader candidate
performs a simple interactive protocol with the endorsers. In this
protocol, a candidate proposes a block and the endorsers confirm the
block from the oldest candidate they observe. The leader candidate
that receives the required quorum of q confirmations from the
endorsers, is chosen as the leader to extend the chain with a new
block.
Essentially, the endorsers act as witnesses and vouch that (1) the
candidate they confirmed was the oldest active on that round and
(2) the candidate committed to extend the chain with a specific
block. Such endorsement guarantees that, with high probability,
only one block from one leader is produced on each round and that
adversaries cannot go back in time to re-write the history. We call
our solution Robust Round Robin in contrast to simple and insecure
standard round robin.
Using random sampling for endorser sampling may sound con-
tradictory to our previous reasoning. However, our key observation
is that although sampling can be biased by the adversary, in our
solution it brings no advantage, such as increased rewards or possi-
bility of double spending (see Section 6 for security analysis).
Besides preventing deep forks, the secondary purpose of the
endorsement mechanism is to track active identities. The leader
that receives the required quorum of confirmations includes the
received confirmations to the created block. By parsing the chain, it
becomes possible to verify which identities have activity in the form
of confirmation messages, and inactive identities can be excluded
from leader candidate and endorser selection.
In the next two sections we describe our solution in more detail.
Section 4 explains identity creation and Section 5 details system
operation.
4 IDENTITY CREATION
In this section we describe two ways to establish identities for our
solution: bootstrapping from existing infrastructures and mining
starting from an initial fair distribution.
4.1 Bootstrap from Existing Infrastructures
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel’s SGX [3] enable
execution of enclaves in isolation from any untrusted software.
For our solution, the most relevant part of SGX is its attestation
protocol where a remote entity can verify that specific enclave code
runs on a genuine SGX processor. The attested processor signs
a statement over the enclave measurement, which was recorded
during its initialization. The verifier forwards the signed statement
to Intel Attestation Service (IAS), an online service run by Intel,
that sends back a signed attestation evidence. SGX attestation uses
group signatures and it is anonymous, in the sense that it does
not identify the attested hardware platform [22]. However, SGX
attestation supports linkablemode that allows the remote verifier to
test if the currently attested processor has been previously attested
without identifying it.
We leverage the linkable attestation mode for bootstrapping
identities. As identities we use public keys of key pairs that are
generated inside enclaves. We bind these keys to the attestation
protocol and save the attestation evidence, signed by IAS, to the
blockchain. Given such evidence, anyone can verify that the same
processor is enrolled at most once.
Importantly, our solution does not require enclave data confi-
dentiality or execution integrity. (We use sealing to protect the
IAS access credential, but its secrecy is not relevant for consensus.)
Thus, our system tolerates adversaries that can compromise their
own processors.
Initialization. A new blockchain can be initialized by any, po-
tentially untrusted, entity that we call chain creator. The creator
registers with Intel and obtains an access credential ca for IAS. At
registration, the creator specifies that linkable mode of attestation
is used (see Appendix C for details).
The creator chooses n0 platforms as the initial system members.
These platforms install enclave code that creates an asymmetric
key pair, seals the private key ski , and exports the public key pki .
The creator performs a remote attestation on each of the selected
platforms. During attestation, each platform supplies a hash of pki
as the USERDATA to be included as part of the QUOTE structure
Qi . If the attestation is successful, IAS signs Qi that includes a
pseudonym pi for the attested platform. The attested enclaves send
their public keys pki to the creator.
The creator checks that the public keys match the respective
hashes reported in each QUOTE structure Qi and that all attested
platforms are separate, i.e., each Qi has a different pseudonym
pi . The chosen n0 platforms run a a distributed random number
generation protocol (e.g., RandHound [35]) to establish an initial
seed0 that is used to bootstrap seed generation for the following
rounds. The platforms also produce a joint proof π0 that the seed
was generated correctly (e.g., the seed signed by all participants).
The creator constructs a genesis block
Block0 = (pk1,Q1,pk2,Q2, ...,he , seed0,π0, id)
that includes public keys pki and the signed quote structures Qi
for each initial member, a hash of the enclave code he , the initial
seed seed0 and proof π0, and a hash id over all elements that serves
as the chain identifier. The creator publishes the block and sends
the IAS access credential ca to the attested enclaves that seal it.
Enrollment. After initialization, the system proceeds in rounds
that are explained in Section 5. New participants can request enroll-
ment to the system on any round. The joining platform installs the
enclave code defined by he , creates a key pair, seals the private part
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skn , exports the public part pkn and contacts one of the current
members, e.g., by broadcasting to the peer-to-peer network.
The current member performs remote attestation on the new
platform usinghe as the reference. During attestation, the enclave of
the new platform supplies a hashh(id | |pkn | |r | |hb ) as itsUSERDATA,
where id is the chain identifier, r the round number and hb the hash
of the latest block (to bind the enrollment to a specific branch). If
the attestation is successful, the existing member obtains a signed
QUOTE structureQn from IAS, including an attestation pseudonym
pn . It verifies that the pseudonym pn does not appear in any of the
previously enrolled platforms in the chain (recall that each Qi is
saved to the ledger). The verifier sends ca to the attested enclave
and constructs an enrollment message
Enrolln = (Qn ,pkn , r ,hb )
and broadcasts it to the network. Once the enrollment message
is included to a new block, a new identity is established.
Re-enrollment. If an enrolled identity does not participate in the
system (by sending confirmation messages) for sufficiently long, it
will be excluded from leader candidate and endorser selection. In
such cases, the platform can perform the enrollment protocol again.
In re-enrollment, a chosen verifier checks that the IAS service
returns the same pseudonym pi that was used for this identity
(public key pki ) during enrollment. If this is the case, the verifier
can create and broadcast a new enrollment message with a flag
that indicates re-enrollment. Once such re-enrollment is recorded
to a new block, the platform is included to leader candidate and
endorser selection again.
4.2 Mining Identities
Our second approach is to “mine” identities, that is, reward suc-
cessful block creation with new identities. A possible strawman
solution would be to reward block creation with new coins and
each owned coin directly corresponds to one or more identities in
the system. As creation of new coins is recorded to the ledger, on
each round the owner of the oldest identity can be chosen as the
miner. However, this strawman has one major limitation: different
coins of same denomination would have different market values. If
a coin is old and soon eligible for block creation, its market value
is arguably higher than that of a new coin. The fact that the units
of the same denomination all have the same value is an important
property of any monetary system.
To avoid this problem, we decouple coins and identities. Every
mining operation creates the normal reward, such as new stake,
and additionally an identity reward. Sufficiently many (Nr ≥ 1)
identity rewards can be used to enroll a new identity to the system.
By adjusting the value of Nr it is possible to control the rate of new
identities entering the system. The identity rewards can be used in
two ways: the block creator can enroll a new identity for himself
or he can sell them to a new user that wants to participate in the
system.
Initialization. The initial distribution of identities can be estab-
lished using a preliminary PoW phase. The initial distribution of
identities is the series of public keys pk0,pk1, ... from the sequence
of blocks InitBlock0 = (pk0,pow0), InitBlock1 = (pk1,pow1), ...
Once the initial n0 identities have been created, the partici-
pants controlling these identities run a distributed randomness
protocol, such as RandHound [35], to create the initial random
seed0 and the matching proof π0 of the correctness of this protocol
run that are both attached to the last initial block: InitBlockn0 =
(pkn0 ,pown0 , seed0,π0). The hash of this block is used as an identi-
fier id for the new chain.
Enrollment. Once an identity pkm has created Nr blocks, it cre-
ates a new key pair (pkn , skn ) that it uses for enrollment. The
enrollment message
Enroll = (h1,h2, ...,hp ,pkn , siдm )
contains a set of hashes {hi } that refer to the Nr previously
created blocks by pkm , the public key of the new identity pkn , and
a signature siдm over these elements using the private part of pkm .
The participant broadcasts the enrollment message, and once it is
included to a new block (see Section 5), a new entity exists in the
system. Validity of the enrollment message requires that (1) the
set of hashes hi refer to previous Nr valid blocks, (2) the previous
blocks have not been used to create a new identity already, (3) all
the referred previous blocks have been created by the same identity
pkm , and (4) the enrollment message signature siдm is correct.
The same mechanism can also be used to allow new participants
to join the system. The owner of the identity rewards can sell them
to another participant by including a public key received from the
buyer to the enrollment message. The payment from the buyer to
the seller can be realized by using fiat money or smart contracts.
The buyer should release the money only once he sees the correct
enrollment message in the chain in a block that has been extended
with d valid blocks to prevent double selling of identity rewards.
5 SYSTEM OPERATION
Once the initial n0 identities are established, our system proceeds
in rounds that have fixed length tr . Next, we explain the system
operation on each round r .
5.1 Candidate and Endorser Selection
In the beginning of each round, every identity tests if it is a leader
candidate or endorser. The number of leader candidates Nc and en-
dorsers Ne are both fixed values (e.g., Nc = 5,Ne = 100). Below, we
will informally describe algorithms for candidate and endorser selec-
tion. We focus on presentation simplicity; actual implementations
can deploy straightforward optimizations like caching previous
values. Pseudocode for the algorithms is provided in Appendix A.
SelectCandidates() parses the chain based on two adjustable pa-
rameters: activity thresholdTa and Nc . An example activity thresh-
old is Ta = 20, 000 rounds that matches one full day of operation.
First, the algorithm selects the chain branch to use (see Select-
Branch below). Then, it parses the selected branch starting from
the newest block till the Ta oldest block. All the identities with
recorded confirmation messages in this period are marked as active.
Next, the algorithm finds the age of active identities and it marks
an identity as inactive, when it has been the oldest for previous NC
rounds (to exclude it from selection if it is not responding). Finally,
it sorts this list by age and returns the Nc oldest identities and their
ages.
6
Figure 3: Endorsement protocol. Each leader candidate
broadcasts Intent messages and endorsers reply with Con-
firmmessages. A node that receives the required quorum of
confirmations becomes an eligible leader for that round and
can broadcast a new block.
SelectEndorsers() computes a list of recently active identities as
explained above. If an identity was created less than enrollment
threshold Te rounds ago (e.g., Te = 100) it will be excluded from
selection to prevent grinding. The algorithm selects Ne identities
using standard simple random sampling (with replacement), where
identities are sorted based on their public key binary. Random
sampling uses seedr−d from the stable part of the chain.
5.2 Endorsement Protocol
Once the leader candidates and endorsers have been selected, each
candidate runs an interactive protocol, shown in Figure 3, with the
endorsers. The protocol consists of three fixed-length phases.
Intent phase. Each leader candidate c broadcasts
Intent = (id,pkc , r ,hp ,htx , siдc )
message that contains the chain identifier id , the candidate’s
identity pkc , the current round number r , the hash of the previous
block hp , hash of the transactions htx the candidate proposes to
include in the next block, and the candidate’s signature siдc over
these elements. In case multiple chain branches, the candidate uses
SelectBranch, described below, to choose which branch to extend.
Confirmation phase. Each endorser e verifies all Intent messages
received during the intent phase by checking that the sender is
a valid leader candidate. Among the valid Intent messages, the
endorser selects the oldest candidate and sends to it
Confirme→c = (id,hi ,h(pkv ), siдe )
message that indicates that endorser e has confirmed candidate
c . This message contains the chain identifier id , hash of the intent
message hi , the endorser identity h(pke ), and a signature siдe over
the previous elements. In case multiple candidates have the same
age (i.e., they were enrolled in the same block), we choose the
oldest candidate in the order their enrollment messages appear in
the block. If an endorser receives intent messages that refer to more
than one chain branches, the endorser picks the branch to confirm
using SelectBranch.
Block dissemination phase. If candidate c receives at least q Con-
firm messages, it is chosen as the leader to create a new block. The
leader creates a new random seed seedr and the matching proof πr
using the previous seed: {seedr ,πr } ← VRF (skm , seedr−1). (The
used VRF should be such that given a random input, the output
should be random, even when the keys are generated by the adver-
sary [19].) After that, the leader creates and broadcasts a new
Blockr = (Intent, {Confirm}, {tx}, {Enroll}, seedr ,πr , siдc )
that contains his intent, the received confirmations, new trans-
actions {tx}, enrollment messages of new identities, the new seed
seedr , the matching proof πr , and a signature siдc over these ele-
ments.
5.3 Chain Validation
Chain validity is verified using the following algorithms.
SelectBranch() selects the valid branch among multiple choices.
First, it verifies the correctness of each branch using VerifyBranch.
Then, it computes a length for each of the branches which is defined
by the number of rounds with missing blocks and selects the longest
branch. If more than one branch has the same length, it chooses the
branch with the older leader at the point of divergence (separate
leaders with the same age are chosen based on their enrollment
order). If both blocks in the point of divergence were created by
the same leader, the branch is chosen based on the binary of the
divergent blocks.
VerifyBranch() checks that a given chain branch is correctly con-
structed. It traverses the chain and checks that each block contains
a correct hash of the previous block. For each block, it verifies the
VRF proof of the random seed. All new identities must have cor-
rect Enroll messages (with valid attestation evidence or identity
rewards). The algorithm verifies that the miner of each block was a
candidate on that round (SelectCandidates), the block contains q
confirmations, the confirmation messages contain the hash of the
Intent message included to the block, the set of included transac-
tion match htx from Intent, and the endorsers were eligible on that
round (SelectEndorsers).
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our solution. For our
analysis we use the definition of stability from Bonneau et al. [10]
with minor adaptation. We say that a consensus scheme is stable if
it provides:
• Eventual consensus. At any time, all honest nodes agree upon
a prefix of what will eventually become the valid blockchain.
• Exponential convergence. The probability of a fork at depth d
in the chain is O(2−d ). That is, after a transaction is added to
a block that is extended with a small number of valid blocks,
the transaction is permanently part of the chain.
• Liveness. New blocks continue to be added and valid transac-
tions included in the blockchain within a reasonable amount
of time.
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• Correctness. All the blocks in the prefix of the eventually valid
chain will only include valid transactions.
• Fairness. On expectation, a consensus participants with frac-
tion α of all stake will create fraction α of all blocks, and collect
a similar fraction of block creation rewards.
6.1 Consensus and Convergence
We first consider the benign case where no participant intentionally
manipulates the random seed. After that, we consider the more
complicated case where the attacker manipulates the seed.
To examine the different possible cases in leader endorsement,
consider an example where the three oldest leader candidates are
A, B and C . The endorser committee is sampled based on seedr−d .
When seedr−d is unbiased and when the identities that take part
in the sampling have been fixed before seedr−d is known (as is the
case in our solution), on the average α of the sampled endorsers are
adversary-controlled. Fraction β of the endorsers may not receive
Intent sent by the oldest candidateA. The remaining fraction 1−α−β
of endorsers who received all messages, confirm A as the leader.
Those endorsers that did not receive all messages may confirm
another candidate (B or C). The adversary-controlled endorsers
may confirm more than one candidate (A and B), although such
equivocation leaves evidence that can be easily used to penalize
malicious identities (see Section 8 for discussion).
In a rare case, at least q endorsers are sampled from the fraction
α + β of active identities. In such case, also the second-oldest candi-
date B may receive the required confirmations, causing two eligible
leaders (A and B) and a fork in the chain. We denote the probabil-
ity of such benign fork sampling as Pr(BFS). Assuming sufficiently
many active identities na , it can be computed as:
Pr(BFS) =
Ne−q∑
i=0
((
Ne
q + i
)
(α + β)q+i (1 − α − β)Ne−q−i
)
.
For example, when α = 0.33, β = 0.05, Ne = 100 and q = 54,
then Pr(BFS) = 0.0008. That is, such sampling would take place, on
the average, every 1200 rounds. Extending both forked branches
requires another similar sampling. As the probability of consecu-
tive sampling decreases exponentially and the probability of three
consecutive samplings is already very low (5.78 × 10−10). For such
parameter values we consider the maximum depth of forks d = 3
in the absence of seed manipulation.
Next, we consider the adversarial case where the attacker inten-
tionally manipulates seedr to bias endorser selection. Recall that
we use VRFs to update the seed for each new block. If the adversary
controls more than one oldest leader candidates, it may choose
which one of these identities it uses to create the block and update
the seed. This gives the adversary more than one seed alternatives
to choose from. If the adversary similarly controls more than one
oldest leader candidate on the next round, he can again choose
which candidate to use to update the seed. Such process allows
the adversary to build a “seed prediction tree” which expansion
factor is the number of controlled oldest candidates on each round
and which depth is the number of successive rounds where the
adversary controls more than one oldest candidate. Since identity
enrollment is permissionless and open, the adversary may control
multiple oldest candidates on several successive rounds and build a
large seed prediction tree.
Assume an adversary that on round r builds a seed prediction tree
of depthdt andwith 280 leafs.We consider that building a tree larger
than that is infeasible, as the tree needs to be constructed online
without pre-computation. This tree allows the adversary to pick the
seed update schedule on round r that will give the most beneficial
endorser sampling sequence starting from round r + dt out of the
280 predicted options. Recall from our above analysis that, given
our example parameter values, benign fork sampling probability
Pr(BFS) = 0.0008. The probability of finding such sampling on,
for example, d = 12 successive rounds reduces exponentially and
becomes very low (6.87×10−32).With the above seed prediction tree,
the adversary has 280 attempts to find such a sequence of samplings.
We call the probability that the adversary finds such adversarial fork
sampling as Pr(AFS) = 6.87×10−32×280 = 8.3×10−14. Thus, setting
the maximum depth of forks to d = 12 prevents such attacks.
Because identity enrollment is open, such seed prediction attacks
cannot be prevented altogether. However, in Section 8 we discuss
how such attacks can be made difficult to realize in practice by
using multiple identity queues and forcing the adversary to plan
the attack years before its execution.
Increasing the quorum size q reduces the probability of forks
at depth d , but weakens liveness guarantees as explained later.
Figure 4a shows that quorum value q = 54 provides a good balance
of security and liveness when Ne = 100.
Increasing number of endorsers Ne also reduces d . As shown
in Figure 4b, when Ne = 200 endorsers are used, forks can be
reduced to d = 6 rounds without compromising liveness. The
main drawback of larger Ne is that such solution requires more
communication on each round. We discuss system performance
and communication complexity in more detail in Section 7.
In Appendix B we extend this analysis to consider different
parameter values, including stronger adversaries (e.g., α = 0.4),
better connectivity (e.g., β = 0.01), and larger endorser committees
(e.g., Ne = 400).
6.2 Liveness
Block creation requires that at least one of the leader candidates
receives q confirmations. We first consider the benign case where
all endorsers confirm the oldest Intent they receive. We denote the
probability that more than Ne − q endorsers will be sampled from
the fraction of β identities that did not receive the Intent message
as benign liveness violation Pr(BLV) and compute it as:
Pr(BLV) =
q∑
i=0
((
Ne
Ne − q + i
)
βNe−q+i (1 − β)q−i
)
.
Given the previous example parameters, this probability is negli-
gible (6.96×10−33). Next, we consider the case where the adversary
reduces the probability of successful block creation by intentionally
not sending Confirm messages to targeted leader candidates. Such
adversarial liveness violation probability Pr(ALV) can be computed
as:
Pr(ALV) =
q∑
i=0
((
Ne
Ne − q + i
)
(α + β)Ne−q+i (1 − α − β)q−i
)
.
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(a) For parameter values Ne = 100, α = 0.33, β = 0.05
quorum q = 54 prevents forks at depth d = 12 without
compromising liveness.
(b) For parameter values Ne = 200, α = 0.33, β = 0.05
quorum q = 108 prevents forks at depth d = 6 without
compromising liveness.
Figure 4: The quorum size q represents a trade-off between
security and liveness. As q increases, the adversarial fork
sampling probability Pr(AFS) reduces and the adversarial
liveness violation probability Pr(ALV) increases.
Given the previous example parameters, the adversary can pre-
vent mining with probability 0.062, that is, on the average every
16th round. The probability to prevent mining on five successive
rounds is 9.37 × 10−7 (see Figure 4a). If the adversary continues
this strategy longer than the activity period Ta , its identities will
be considered inactive and they can no longer reduce the mining
probability for other participants.
As in any leader-based blockchain consensus scheme, the chosen
leader can exclude transactions from targeted users, and therefore
no such scheme can provide an absolute guarantee that a new trans-
action is included to the next block. In our approach, this problem
is somewhat exacerbated. Since the adversary may control block
creation on multiple successive rounds, it may prevent inclusion
of specific transactions for a longer time. In this regard, our solu-
tion provides a weaker liveness guarantee than schemes based on
random leader selection. While we cannot prevent such denial-of-
service attacks altogether, in Section 8 we discuss how such attack
can be made difficult to realize in practice by using multiple identity
queues.
6.3 Correctness
Regarding transaction correctness, similar to any other leader-based
consensus scheme, the chosen leader can include invalid transac-
tions to the published block. Users can detect and ignore falsely
formatted transactions. Transactions that appear valid in the cur-
rent branch but contradict transactions in another branch (e.g.,
double spending) can be detected by waiting d rounds. Thus, all
transactions in the chain prefix up to Blockr−d are either valid or
ignored.
6.4 Fairness
The adversary can attempt to violate fairness in few ways. The first
approach is that the adversary does not include Enroll messages
from the targeted victim participant to its blocks. This approach
can delay enrollment of a new identity by a few rounds, but not
prevent it, and thus such an approach does not violate fairness in
the long term. The second approach is that the adversary does not
include Confirm messages from the victim to its blocks and after
Ta rounds the victim is excluded from miner candidate selection
and has to re-enroll. Such adversarial exclusion probability can be
computed as
Pr(AE) = (1 − Ne/na )Ta (1−α ).
Assuming na = 10, 000 active participants and our example pa-
rameters, the adversarial exclusion probability is negligible (3.25 ×
10−59). If the size of the system increases to na = 100, 000 the ad-
versarial exclusion probability is still low (1.5 × 10−6). If the grows
larger than that, the value ofTa may have to be increased to ensure
that active identities are not excluded from selection.
6.5 SGX Considerations
The adversary may attempt to enroll non-SGX platforms, but such
false enrollment would fail, as the IAS will not return a signed
QUOTE needed for enrollment. Enrolling the same SGX platform
multiples times would fail as well, because the IAS would return the
same pseudonym pn that is already recorded for another identity in
the chain. The third alternative is to enroll the same SGX platform
to multiple chains and try to reuse enrollment from one chain to
another. Because the QUOTE contains the chain identifier id , this
approach would not work either.
The adversary does not gain advantage (more identities or se-
lection bias) by breaking into her own SGX processors. Besides
attestation, we only use enclaves for the protection of the IAS cre-
dential and leakage of this credential does not allow the adversary
to create additional identities. A malicious chain creator could ini-
tialize an invalid chain, where all members are not SGX processors.
However, any legitimate participant can detect this due to missing
QUOTEs in the genesis block and neglect the chain.
In case the attestation service (IAS) is temporarily unavailable,
new identities cannot be enrolled during its downtime. However,
the system can produce new blocks and thus process incoming
transactions normally. Therefore, the centralized IAS is not critical
for liveness.
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6.6 Privacy Considerations
Since block creation is based on long-term identities, correlation
of block creation events by the same participant becomes trivial.
This is a limitation of our approach compared consensus systems
where participants pick new identities for every round. However,
we emphasize that the identities used for transactions can be com-
pletely separate from those used for consensus and block creation.
For example, transactions can be based on changeable pseudonyms
or cryptographic commitments that hide user identities and trans-
action values [24, 29].
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we explain the experiments we performed in order
to estimate suitable round duration tr , transaction latency and
throughput.
7.1 Experimental Setup
We built a globally-distributed peer-to-peer network using Ama-
zon’s AWS infrastructure. We instantiated nodes in Frankfurt, Lon-
don, Singapore, Mumbai and Oregon. We used the EC2 compute
services with nodes ranging from t2.micro (single vCPU with 1 GB
RAM) to m4.2xlarge (8 vCPUs and 16 GB RAM). The node software
was written in Java and run on Ubuntu/Linux OS. To simulate the
worst case scenario, we ensured that the leader candidate was never
located in the same data center as any of the endorsers. To simulate
global distribution of participants, we enforced that messages have
to travel through at least x different nodes (x being 0, 2 and 6) before
reaching their destination. We set the Intent and Confirm message
sizes to 1 KB (although actual messages are smaller). For blocks we
tested for three sizes: 500KB, 1MB and 2MB.
Network optimization. During testing we observed that majority
of the block dissemination delay came from the initial block trans-
mission by the leader candidate, due to a high out-degree and due
to multiple hops across geographically distant locations. To address
these issues, we implemented a networking structure where we
selected some nodes within a cluster of geographically close nodes
to serve as top-level nodes, i.e., nodes that are directly connected
to by leaders when broadcasting the block. These top nodes have
a large out-degree to mid-level nodes within the same geographi-
cal area. This optimization led to a significant reduction in block
dissemination latency. (We did not see the need to use the same
approach in the intent phase, as it did not lead to any noticeable
improvement.) We emphasize that the top and middle nodes are not
different from other network nodes. Any node could be chosen as a
top or middle node and messages may be broadcast to multiple top
nodes within a cluster. In a large deployment, the top-level nodes
may be chosen by reliability and performance metrics similar to
the Tor network.
7.2 Results
We measured message delivery times for various system and block
size. Figure 5 summarizes the results of our experiments.
In Figure 5a we plot the time required for leader selection (com-
bined Intent message delivery and Confirm message reception).
This time grows from 130 ms for small endorser committee size
(a) Intent and confirmation time.
(b) Block dissemination time.
Figure 5: Experimental results formessage delivery times in
our test setup, a globally-distributed peer-to-peer network
using Amazon’s AWS infrastructure.
Ne = 5 to 257 ms for large committee size Ne = 1000. We con-
clude that setting the combined duration of these two phases to
one second is sufficient in a network environment like ours.
Figure 5b shows the time required for block dissemination (95th
percentile) that grows from 357 ms for a system size of na = 10
active nodes to 1.1 seconds for a system size of na = 10, 000 active
nodes. We conclude that setting the duration of block dissemination
phase to 4 seconds is sufficient for our network. The above two
values give us a round duration of tr = 5 seconds.
Throughput and latency. Given such example round duration
tr = 5 seconds, we can now estimate system throughput tp for or
solution as follows:
tp =
1
tr × (B − H − (Ne × SC ) − (na × SE ))
T
,
where H is invariant block header (280 bytes), SC is the size
of Confirm message (416 bytes), B is the used block size, T is the
transaction size, and SE is the size of the Enroll message. Assuming
B = 2 MB and T = 250 bytes, similar to Bitcoin [8], Ne = 100 en-
dorsers and few enrolments per round (owing to fast rounds), 99%+
of the block is left for the transactions and the system throughput
is approximately 1500 transaction per second. Transaction latency
is one minute (when d = 12) or 30 seconds (d = 6).
8 DISCUSSION
Improved latency and liveness. An adversary that controls multi-
ple oldest identities can predict seed evolution which enables deeper
forks and thus higher latency. Although seed prediction cannot be
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prevented completely, it can be made difficult to realize in practice.
One possible defensive approach is to use multiple queues. Recall
that in our approach all identities are essentially placed into one
queue in the order of their age and the oldest identities are picked
as leader candidates in round robin. Instead of using a single queue,
identities could be placed into multiple queues. For example, in
a system that has been operational for five years and each year
equally many identities were enrolled, a separate queue could be
established for each enrollment year. The leader selection could
happen such that the oldest identity is picked from each queue in
turn. To perform successful seed prediction, the adversary would
now have to plan the attack years ahead, so that he controls identi-
ties in all queues at correct places. The same applies for targeted
liveness attacks. To prevent processing of victim’s transactions, the
adversary would have to plan his enrollment schedule years before
the attack takes place.
Besides improved security, multiple queues could be used also
as a performance enhancing mechanism. Similar to sharding, each
queue could process a separate set of incoming transactions in
parallel which could increase the system’s overall throughput. We
consider multiple identity queues an interesting direction for future
work.
Predictable leader selection can make denial-of-service attacks
easier. For example, the adversary can prepare the attack in advance
and launch it when the victim becomes leader candidate. Interest-
ingly, such predictability can also help participants in avoiding DoS
attacks. Participants can obtain multiple IP addresses and switch to
using a different IP before their identity becomes the leader candi-
date. Similar defensive approaches are harder to realize in systems
with randomized leader selection.
Bootstrapping from other infrastructures. Similar to Intel SGX,
reliable identities could be bootstrapped also from other infrastruc-
tures. For example, mobile phone operators, credit card companies
or passport issuers could take the role of IAS and provide an in-
terface that allows their customers to enroll new identities in a
controlled manner, such as one identity per person or mobile phone
subscription. Another attestation infrastructure that could be lever-
aged is TrustZone smartphones [6]. Also new and emerging secure
processor architectures that are designed specifically for distributed
ledger technologies [4] could be used to create identities for our
solution. Recent efforts to standardize EPID provisioning and at-
testation across manufacturers [21, 22] could provide a vendor
independent way of bootstrapping identities. Identities could also
be bootstrapped from multiple sources (say, credit card number and
TrustZone smartphone and registered phone number) to provide
the right security and usability for the particular use case. We focus
on SGX identities, as the IAS service enables deployment of our
solution today without any changes to existing infrastructures.
Expanding the role of endorsers. In our solution, the endorsers
confirm the oldest leader candidate they observe, regardless of the
content of the block that the candidate proposes to create. The role
of the endorsers could be expanded to examine the proposed block,
e.g., for validity of proposed transactions. Such optimizations could
allow the endorsers to ignore leaders that would extend the chain
with invalid blocks and pick a different leader candidate instead.
Penalizing malicious behavior. In most permissionless consensus
schemes identities can be easily changed. For example, a Bitcoin
miner can use a different public key every time he starts mining
for a new block. In our approach identities cannot be changed
after the initial enrollment, as they are recorded to the blockchain.
One advantage of long-lived identities is that penalizing malicious
behavior becomes possible. For example, if an endorser confirms
multiple intents on the same round, any entity that observes this
can broadcast the conflicting and signed confirmation messages
and the next miner can include them to a new block as evidence
of cheating which could result in automated elimination of the
malicious identity from the system. Thus, participants have an
incentive to avoid misbehavior.
Economic aspects. In case of SGX identities, participants are in-
centivized to buy the cheapest processors that enable enrollment.
If processors have significantly different value, this could raise
questions about the fairness [7]. We argue that Intel, or similar
manufacturer, is unlikely to sell unused but outdated products in
mass-scale and purchasing cheap second-hand processors may not
provide an advantage, because those CPUs may have already been
enrolled. Also, enrollment of very old CPUs can be prevented. In
SGX, the attestation group signature does not identify the individual
CPU but it does reveal the manufacturing batch.
9 RELATEDWORK
In Section 2 we outlined the limitations of several related solutions.
In this section we review additional related work. For a general
comparison and classification of blockchain consensus, we refer
the reader to [7].
Other Proof-of-Stake schemes. Ouroboros Praos [14] is another
PoS scheme that leverages VRFs for new random value generation
on each round, similar to Algorand [30]. The main limitation of
this approach is that such randomness can be biased and thus the
solution does not provide fairness.
RapidChain [37] samples a reference committee from all con-
sensus participants. The reference committee is then responsible
for running a distributed randomness generation protocol in the
beginning of each epoch to create new randomness for that epoch.
The randomness protocol is based on verifiable secret sharing (VSS).
The main limitations of this approach is that the reference com-
mittee becomes an obvious target for attacks and the distributed
random generation protocol is expensive.
DFINITY [20] introduces a novel decentralized an random bea-
con that leverages BLS threshold signatures for periodic unbiased
random values generation. This scheme requires a setup phase dur-
ing which an expensive distributed key generation (DKG) protocol
is run. Once this is done, new random values can be derived by col-
lecting signature shares from sufficiently many participants. In this
approach, the per round or per epoch randomness generation has
low communication complexity, but the main cost is the expensive
DKG protocol in the setup phase that needs to be repeated when
new participants join or leave the system.
Other TEE solutions. Proof of Luck (PoL) [32] is SGX-based solu-
tion that has the same basic idea and the same main limitations as
PoET (recall Section 2).
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PoTS [5] is another PoS solution that uses SGX and is designed
to tolerate compromised TEEs that control up to 50% stake. One
drawback of this approach is that compromising a small number
of high-stake TEEs it may be possible to compromise of the en-
tire system (due to concentration of stake to few rich individuals).
Moreover, the approach does not provide fairness. Finally, PoTS
requires TEEs, while our solution works also without them.
Resource Efficient Mining (REM) [38] replaces the hash compu-
tation of PoW with attested enclave computation. This approach
allows more useful usage of energy, but it does not eliminate the
need for massive collective computation. Our approach requires
no solving of computationally intensive puzzles and thus it saves
significant amounts of energy compared to PoW-based solutions.
Coin aging. PPCoin [27] introduced the idea that each coin has
an associated age and leader selection is based on hashing procedure
where the target difficulty is coin-specific and lower for older coins.
However, the suggested scheme is vulnerable to a simple attack
where the adversary waits so that he owns enough old coins and
then creates a deep fork for double spending. The authors suggest
that such attacks could be addressed with a central time-stamping
mechanismwhich is a circular argument for a decentralized and per-
missionless blockchain consensus scheme. Additionally, the leader
selection is not fair, because selection can be manipulated with
simple grinding strategies.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have explored an alternative idea for blockchain
consensus — selecting consensus leader candidates deterministically
instead of the common random selection approach and complement-
ing such selection with a simple interactive endorsement protocol.
The main benefits of our solution are simplicity and fairness. As
our analysis shows, the latter is especially important in systems
where block creation is rewarded with new stake which is a com-
mon practice is permissionless blockchains. Although deterministic
selection has also its own limitations (weaker DoS resilience), this
work shows that it provides a viable and previously unexplored
alternative to random selection.
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A PSEUDOCODE FOR ALGORITHMS
In this appendix, we provide pseudocode for algorithms that were
described in Section 5. For presentation simplicity, we omit sim-
ple optimizations, such as caching, and trivial checks and helper
functions.
Algorithm 1 SelectCandidates
1: procedure SelectCandidates(branch)
2: ActiveSet{} ← SelectActive(branch)
3: SortByAge(ActiveSet)
4: CandidateSet{} ← ActiveSet[0:Nc−1]
5: while InactiveRounds(CandidateSet[0]) ≥ Nc do
6: CandidateSet[0]← Inactive
7: CandidateSet[Nc ]← ActiveSet[Nc ]
8: ShiftLeft(CandidateSet,1)
9: return CandidateSet
Algorithm 2 SelectEndorsers
1: procedure SelectEndorsers(branch)
2: ActiveNodes{}← SelectActive(branch)
3: foreach node ∈ ActiveNodes do
4: if EnrollmentAge(node) < Te then
5: ActiveNodes = ActiveNodes \node
6: EndorserSet← RandomSampling(Seedr−d , ActiveNodes)
7: return EndorserSet
Algorithm 3 SelectActive
1: procedure SelectActive(branch)
2: iterBlock ← Top(branch)
3: i← 0
4: ActiveSet{} ← ∅
5: while i < Ta do
6: i← i + 1
7: BlockEndorsers ← GetEndorsers(iterBlock)
8: foreach Endorser ∈ BlockEndorsers do
9: if Endorser < ActiveSet then
10: ActiveSet ← ActiveSet ∪ Endorser
11: iterBlock← Next(iterBlock)
12: return ActiveSet
Algorithm 4 SelectBranch
1: procedure SelectBranch(Branches{})
2: foreach branch ∈ Branches{} do
3: if VerifyBranch(branch) , true then
4: Branches← Branches \branch
5: Branches← SortByLength(Branches)
6: Longest{}← SelectLongest(Branches)
7: if |Longest | = 1 then
8: return Longest[0]
9: else
10: Selected ← Longest[0]
11: counter ← 1
12: while counter < |Longest | do
13: current ← Longest[counter]
14: Divergent ← GetFork(Selected,current)
15: if LeaderAge(Selected, Divergent) < LeaderAge(current, Divergent) then
16: Selected ← current
17: if LeaderAge(Selected, Divergent) = LeaderAge(current, Divergent) then
18: if Binary(Selected,Divergent) < Binary(current, Divergent) then
19: Selected ← current
20: return Selected
Algorithm 5 VerifyBranch
1: procedure VerifyBranch(currentBranch)
2: prevBlock ← Genesis(currentBranch)
3: iterBlock ← Next(prevBlock, currentBranch)
4: currentBlock ← Top(currentBranch)
5: while iterBlock , CurrentBlock do
6: if Hash(prevBlock) , prevHash(iterBlock) then
7: return false
8: iterLeader ← Leader(iterBlock)
9: if iterLeader < SelectCandidates(currentBranch[0, iterBlock]) then
10: return false
11: intent← GetIntent(iterBlock)
12: if GetTxHash(intent) , Hash(GetTx(iterBlock)) then
13: return false
14: counter ← 0
15: foreach endorsement ∈ Endorsements(iterBlock) do
16: if VerifyEndorsement(endorsement,iterBlock) , true then
17: return false
18: counter ← counter+1
19: if counter < q then
20: return false
21: if VerifyVRF(iterBlock) , true then
22: return false
23: foreach enrollment ∈ Enrollments(iterBlock) do
24: if verify(enrollment) , true then
25: return false
26: prevBlock← iterBlock
27: iterBlock← Next(iterBlock, currentBranch)
28: return true
Algorithm 6 VerifyEndorsement
1: procedure VerifyEndorsement(endorsement, block, branch)
2: endorser ← GetEndorser(endorsement)
3: intent ← GetIntent(block)
4: leader ← GetLeader(block)
5: if GetChainID(endorsement) , GetChainID(block) then
6: return false
7: if endorser < SelectEndorsers(branch[0, block]) then
8: return false
9: if hash(intent) , GetIntentHash(endorsement) then
10: return false
11: if hash(leader) , GetLeaderHash(endorsement) then
12: return false
13: signature← GetSignature(endorsement)
14: body ← GetBody(endorsement)
15: return VerifySignature(signature, body, endorser)
B ADDITIONAL PARAMETER VALUES
In this appendix, we extend our analysis from Section 6 to consider
further example values for our system parameters.
We start by examining the effect of larger α , i.e., cases where the
adversary controls a larger fraction of all identities in the system.
As can be see from Figure 6a, when α = 0.4 and the fraction of
non-responsive identities remains as before (β = 0.05), using our
previous example value of Ne = 200 endorsers, there is no quorum
value q that would prevent forks at the same depth d = 12 without
reducing liveness. To handle such cases we must either increase
the endorser committee size or the maximum depth of forks. Fig-
ure 6b shows that increasing the size of the endorser committee
moderately to Ne = 400 and simultaneously increasing the depth
of the forks to d = 18 allows us to find a quorum value q = 202 that
provides good security and liveness at the same time.
Tolerating such stronger adversaries (α = 0.4) becomes sig-
nificantly easier in our solution when the connectivity between
13
(a) When α = 0.4 and β = 0.05 using Ne = 200 endorsers
there is no quorum value q that prevents forks at depth
d = 12 and provides good liveness.
(b) When α = 0.4 and β = 0.05 using Ne = 400 endorsers
there is a quorum value q = 202 that prevents forks at
depth d = 18 and ensures good liveness.
(c) When α = 0.4 and β = 0.01 using Ne = 200 endorsers
there is a quorum value q = 104 that prevents forks at
depth d = 12 and provides good liveness.
(d) When α = 0.4 and β = 0.01 using Ne = 100 endorsers
there is a quorum value q = 51 that prevents forks at
depth d = 22 and provides good liveness.
(e) When α = 0.4 and β = 0.01 using Ne = 200 endorsers
there is a quorum value q = 111 that prevents forks at
depth d = 7, when adversarial liveness violation is in-
creased to 10 rounds.
(f) When α = 0.33 and β = 0.05 using Ne = 100 endorsers
there is a quorum value q = 57 that prevents forks at
depth d = 8, when adversarial liveness violation is in-
creased to 10 rounds.
Figure 6: Security versus liveness with additional example parameter values.
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consensus nodes is better. As shown in Figure 6c, if we assume the
fraction of non-responsive identities on each round to be smaller
(β = 0.01), it is possible to find a suitable quorum size (q = 104) that
provides prevents forks at depth d = 12 using Ne = 200 endorsers.
Figure 6d shows that in principle stronger adversaries (α = 0.4) can
be handled without increasing the committee size (Ne = 100) by
only increasing the maximum depth of forks (d = 22) which would
mean a latency of almost two minutes.
Allowing longer adversarial liveness violation enables shallower
forks. Next, we consider the case where we allow the adversary to
prevent block creation for 10 rounds. Figure 6e shows that when
α = 0.4 and β = 0.01, using Ne = 200 endorsers there is a quorum
value q = 111 that prevents forks at depth d = 7 (in contrast
to previous value d = 12). Similarly, Figure 6f shows that when
α = 0.33 and β = 0.05, using Ne = 100 endorsers there is a quorum
value q = 57 that prevents forks at depth d = 8.
We conclude that our solution can handle various assumptions
regarding the strength of the adversary and connectivity between
the system participants, but our solution is best suited to scenarios
where the adversary controls up to one third of all identities, but
also stronger adversaries can be tolerated by using larger endorser
committees or by reducing liveness guarantees.
C SGX ATTESTATION DETAILS
In this appendix, we provide further details on the SGX’s attestation
mechanism. The enclave initialization actions performed by the
OS are recorded securely by the CPU. This process creates a mea-
surement that captures the enclave’s code configuration. Remote
attestation is an protocol where an external verifier can verify that
an enclave with the expected measurement was correctly initial-
ized in a genuine SGX processor. The attestation protocol involves
three parties: (i) the remote verifier, (ii) the attested SGX platform,
and (iii) IAS that is an online service operated by Intel and it is
illustrated in Figure 7.
The protocol proceeds as follows: (1) the remote verifier sends
a random challenge to an unprotected application on the attested
Figure 7: SGX remote attestation protocol that involves
three parties: (i) the remote verifier, (ii) the attested SGXplat-
form, and (iii) IAS that is an online service operated by Intel.
platform that (2) forwards it to the enclave that (3) returns a RE-
PORT data structure encrypted for the Quoting Enclave containing
the enclave’s measurement. The REPORT data structure includes a
USERDATA field, where the attested enclave can include application-
specific attestation information, such as hash of its public key. (4)
The application forwards REPORT to Quoting Enclave that (5) veri-
fies it and returns aQUOTE structure signed by a processor-specific
attestation key. (6) The application sends QUOTE to the remote
verifier that (7) forwards it to the IAS online service that (8) verifies
the QUOTE signature, checks that the attestation key has not been
revoked, and in case of successful attestation returns the QUOTE
structure signed by IAS.
The attestation key is a part of a group signature scheme called
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) [22] that supports two signaturemodes.
The default mode is privacy-preserving. Another, linkable mode
allows IAS to verify, if the currently attested CPU is the same as
previously attested CPU. Usage of SGX attestation requires regis-
tration with Intel. Upon registration, each service provider receives
a credential that they use to authenticate to IAS. If linkable mode
of attestation is used, IAS reports the same pseudonym every time
the same service provider requests attestation of the same CPU [2].
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